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Abstract: In this paper, we demonstrate the effective-
ness of using the theory of contextual integrity (CI) to
annotate and evaluate privacy policy statements. We
perform a case study using CI annotations to compare
Facebook’s privacy policy before and after the Cam-
bridge Analytica scandal. The updated Facebook pri-
vacy policy provides additional details about what in-
formation is being transferred, from whom, by whom,
to whom, and under what conditions. However, some
privacy statements prescribe an incomprehensibly large
number of information flows by including many CI pa-
rameters in single statements. Other statements result
in incomplete information flows due to the use of vague
terms or omitting contextual parameters altogether. We
then demonstrate that crowdsourcing can effectively
produce CI annotations of privacy policies at scale.
We test the CI annotation task on 48 excerpts of pri-
vacy policies from 17 companies with 141 crowdworkers.
The resulting high precision annotations indicate that
crowdsourcing could be used to produce a large corpus
of annotated privacy policies for future research.
Keywords: Privacy policies, contextual integrity, anno-
tation
1 Introduction
Many online services operate by collecting and sharing
users’ information. To protect consumers, the U.S. Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) devised fair information
practice principles (FIPPs) based on the “notice and
choice” framework [9]. These principles, in concert with
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state regulations, require companies to notify consumers
about their information collection and sharing practices
through privacy policies. These privacy policies, which
often include details about the type of information col-
lected, the entities that receive or store the information,
and the conditions governing data acquisition and han-
dling, serve two main purposes: 1) informing consumers
about data collection practices, which they can consider
when deciding whether or not to use a service, and 2)
offering regulators, such as the FTC, a way to audit
online services for misleading privacy practices.
As we write this paper, the European General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [2] is coming into ef-
fect, forcing companies to adapt their behavior and
rewrite their privacy policies or face strict penalties. The
changes are largely based on GDPR Articles 13, 14, and
15, which outline the details companies need to provide
to consumers when collecting, processing and sharing
their information. The regulation puts an emphasis on
providing this information to the “subject in a concise,
transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, us-
ing clear and plain language” [1]. As a result, consumers
are receiving an avalanche of updated privacy policies
as companies strive for GDPR compliance [4]. However,
just because the GDPR has pushed companies to up-
date their privacy policies does not necessarily mean
that these updated policies address the issues of previ-
ous versions.
In this paper, we make a case for using the the-
ory of contextual integrity (CI) [22] to annotate, assess,
and compare information sharing practices disclosed in
privacy policies, both within and across updates. We
showcase this technique with a case study in which we
use the CI framework to manually annotate Facebook’s
previous and updated privacy policies to identify the
senders, recipients and subjects of information, informa-
tion types (attributes), and the conditions under which
information may be transferred or collected (transmis-
sion principles). We then use these annotations to gain
insight into the privacy policy and amendments.
Our analysis shows that while the updated privacy
policy includes statements that describe almost as twice
as many information flows as the current policy, it fails
to provide more clarity to the consumer. In many cases,
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the updated policy has more incomplete and ambigu-
ous information flow statements than the current pol-
icy. Incomplete information flow statements (45% of all
statements in the current policy and 63% in the up-
dated policy) do not mention one or many information
flow parameters. This allows readers to interpret the
missing parameters according to their own expectations,
which may not match the actual practices of the com-
pany. In contrast, some statements in both current and
updated policies suffer from what we refer to as “param-
eter bloating,” i.e., they contain more than one instance
of each CI parameter. This increases the cognitive load
required for consumers to fully comprehend all possible
information flows allowed by the statement. Finally, we
identified privacy statements (over 50% in both current
and updated policies) that use vague and ambiguous
language.
To help streamline our approach beyond the Face-
book case study, we present a methodology for crowd-
sourcing CI privacy policy annotations. We construct CI
annotation as a Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) Hu-
man Intelligence Task (HIT) and compare crowdsourced
annotations against ground-truth expert annotations.
We test the annotation task on 48 excerpts of privacy
policies from 17 companies with 141 AMT workers. The
crowdsourced annotations have an average word-based
precision score of 0.9 across CI information flow param-
eters. This high precision indicates that CI annotation
is both understandable and easily applicable by those
with no prior exposure to CI, despite the often legalis-
tic language employed by privacy policies. This provides
further evidence that CI successfully expresses how most
people intuitively reason about information privacy. Fi-
nally, the high precision of crowdsourced annotations
indicates that crowdsourcing could be applied at scale
to evaluate future privacy policy updates or to build a
dataset for training a machine learning model to per-
form automatic CI annotations.
In summary, this work makes the following contri-
butions:
1. We present a method for annotating privacy policies
using the contextual integrity framework. The use
of a structured framework allows rigorous analysis
of difficult privacy policy texts that is applicable to
policies across companies and sectors.
2. We describe a case study using CI annotation to
analyze recent updates to Facebook’s privacy policy,
which identifies several issues with information flow
descriptions across versions.
3. We demonstrate that crowdsourcing can produce
precise CI annotations of legalistic privacy policy
excerpts for future CI annotation research at scale.
2 CI Primer
The theory of CI is based on two central premises: 1)
privacy is defined as the appropriateness of information
flows, which 2) is defined by contextual norms governing
particular settings (contexts) in which information is
transmitted [22].
CI offers a template for describing information flows
using 5-parameter tuples, which include specific actors
(senders, recipients, and subjects) involved in the in-
formation flow, the type (attribute) of the information,
and the condition (transmission principle) under which
the information flow occurs. This combination of five
parameters defines contexts which determine privacy
norms. For example, while someone might consider shar-
ing Fitbit1 data with their doctor, they might view the
sharing of this same data with advertising or insurance
companies as a privacy violation. The entire context, in-
cluding recipient and information type, affects how we
think about privacy.
The CI framework was previously used as a lens
for examining android permissions [34], online platform
practices [14, 37], and examining GDPR regulations [13]
themselves. In more recent efforts, CI was employed to
capture individuals’ privacy expectations, which can be
then checked for inconsistencies or used to inform poli-
cymakers and manufacturers [5, 29].
3 Related work
Privacy policies are notoriously hard to read. As a re-
sult, average users find them difficult to comprehend
and correctly interpret. This leads to gaps between
users’ expectations and the stated policy [20].
The problem of privacy policy comprehension has
been the focus of many previous studies. Some efforts
focused on lexical [11, 27] and semantic [28] analysis of
the privacy policies. Others works [36] used crowdsourc-
ing to provide annotations that allow users to more eas-
ily parse privacy policies and identify sections related
1 https://www.fitbit.com/home
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to specific concerns, as well as to help researchers assess
policies from different websites.
The Usable Privacy Policy Project (UPPP) [26] has
recruited law students to hand-annotate 115 privacy
policies with metadata tags such as “first party collec-
tion/use,” “user choice/control,” “data retention,” and
“data security.” They then used the hand-labeled poli-
cies to train a machine learning algorithm that has an-
notated over 7,000 policies with the same metadata
tags [35]. While extracting relevant paragraphs saves
time for the interested reader, it does not provide a way
of identifying issues with the policy itself. It is remains
up to the reader to interpret the text. This tends to cre-
ate gaps between privacy expectations and policy state-
ments, especially when policy statements are ambiguous
or incomplete [20].
Recent work has shown evidence that privacy poli-
cies often elide or obscure crucial contextual information
that could help users formulate their privacy expecta-
tions. In 2016, Martin and Nissenbaum [21] showed that
when confronted with a privacy-related scenario that
was missing some contextual information, respondents
mentally supplemented the information, essentially gen-
erating a different version of the scenario. Martin and
Nissenbaum also conducted a survey of 569 respondents
presented with 40 scenarios with random combination of
contextual factors. The results showed that the “context
of information exchange – how information is used and
transmitted, the sender and receiver of the information –
all impact the privacy expectations of individuals” [21].
The importance of including contextual factors was
also reported by Rao et al., in a 2016 study that com-
pared users’ privacy expectations with existing com-
panies’ practices [24]. 240 participants were asked to
state their expectations for the data collection, shar-
ing, and deletion practices of 16 websites across finance,
health, and dictionary categories. The results showed
that users’ privacy expectations depend on the type of
website and the type of information being exchanged.
For example, respondents expected medical data to be
shared with a medical website, but not a financial web-
site. These findings provide further evidence to support
the importance of contextual factors in how individu-
als perceive privacy practices, motivating a contextual
analysis of privacy policies to identify gaps which might
result in mismatched privacy expectations.
Another body of work has explored using crowd-
sourcing to annotate privacy policies, thereby splitting
the cognitive load of understanding an individual pol-
icy over multiple workers. In 2016, Wilson et. al., [36]
explored the feasibility of asking crowdworkers to an-
swer questions on data collection practices. In the ex-
periment, 218 crowdworkers were assigned the task of
reading through 12 privacy policies and answering 9
questions about data collection, sharing, and deletion
practices stated in the policies. To support their an-
swers, respondents needed to annotate the relevant text
in the privacy policies. The results showed that the an-
swers of the crowdworkers agreed with those of skilled
annotators over 80% of the time. The results indicate
that crowdsourcing can be used to identify paragraphs
describing specific practices in privacy policies. Our re-
sults support this conclusion, but extend it to even more
sophisticated annotations of individual components of
contextual information flows described in privacy poli-
cies.
4 Annotation Methodology
We use the CI framework to annotate policy statements
that describe contextual information exchanges. Our use
of a CI flow-based abstraction is an important distinc-
tion from previous privacy policy annotation research,
as it serves a useful semantic abstraction for checking
privacy statements for more complex properties than
previously attempted. For the remainder of the paper,
we denote a privacy statement with a single set of CI
parameters as an “information flow.” For example, we
consider the following statement an information flow,
or simply as a “flow:”
We [Facebook]recipient also collect contact in-
formationattribute that yousender provide if you
upload, sync or import this information
(such as an address book) from a device.TP
This flow contains an explicit sender, recipient, at-
tribute, and transmission principle. The subject pa-
rameter is not included, but is implicitly the consumer
agreeing to the privacy policy.
We use the following guidelines to identify CI pa-
rameters within individual flows for annotation:
– Sender. Any entity (person, company, website, de-
vice, etc.) that transfers or shares the information.
This may be a pronoun or a specific entity, such as
“Company A,” “strategic partners,” or “publisher.”
– Recipient. Any entity (person, company, website,
device, etc.) that ultimately receives the informa-
tion. This may be a pronoun or a specific entity,
such as “third party,” “developer,” “other users,” or
“Company B and its affiliates.”
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Fig. 1. Screenshot of the Multi-document Annotation Environ-
ment tool configured for CI privacy policy annotation.
– Transmission principle. Any clause describing
the “terms and conditions under which [...] transfers
ought (or ought not) to occur” [22]. This includes
descriptions of how information may be used or col-
lected. Examples include “if the user gives consent,”
“when an update occurs,” or “to perform specified
functions.”
– Attribute. Any description of information type,
instance, and/or example, such as “date of birth,”
“credit card number,” “photos,” or, more generally,
“personal information.”
– Subject. Any subjects of the information ex-
changed in a flow. Subjects may be explicitly stated
or implicitly described using pronouns and posses-
sives.
We perform manual policy annotation using Docu-
ment Type Definitions (DTD) markup and the Multi-
document Annotation Environment [3] (Figure 1).
5 Facebook Case Study
Recent revelations about the misuse of consumer data
by Facebook and Cambridge Analytica [12] has rekin-
dled the debate around users’ privacy and informed con-
sent on such platforms. Facebook claims [10] that they
provide users with the right level of control to keep their
information private. They also claim that consumers
are well informed by the disclosure of information han-
dling practices in the company’s privacy framework. As-
suming that this is indeed the case, i.e., ignoring the
complexity and a sporadic evolution of Facebook con-
trols [15, 17, 19], we see the Cambridge Analytica scan-
dal as another example of how things can go wrong
when consumers’ privacy expectations are misaligned
with privacy policy statements.
Much of the problem stems from not having a coher-
ent higher-level abstraction that can help reason about
privacy policies. While talented legal scholars and pro-
fessionals are trained to identify relevant privacy pol-
icy excerpts and mentally stitch them into coherent
flows, so to speak, the average consumer is usually over-
whelmed by the legal language of privacy policies [31].
Even experts themselves find some privacy policy state-
ments confusing [25].
Furthermore, research shows that consumers’ tend
to “[project] the important factors to their privacy ex-
pectations onto the privacy notice” [20]. In other words,
consumers implicitly fill in the blanks left by difficult-
to-interpret policies, which inadvertently widens the gap
between their expectations and actual company behav-
iors.
As a result of public outcry [12], Facebook has
amended its privacy policy to include a more detailed
account of its information sharing practices. It is there-
fore timely and instructive to apply our CI annotation
technique to the previous and updated Facebook pri-
vacy policies in order to demonstrate the power of the
method and highlight issues with both policy versions.
5.1 Analysis
Using the methodology described in Section 4, we manu-
ally annotated Facebook’s previous privacy policy (data
policy) as well as the official updated version2. The fol-
lowing sections demonstrate the range of analyses that
can be performed using CI annotations but are not ex-
haustive. We anticipate a variety of additional analytic
techniques building on these annotations in future work.
5.1.1 Comparison of CI parameters
We compared the number information flows prescribed
by both previous and updated Facebook privacy poli-
cies (Figure 2) and the CI parameters they contain.
We matched CI parameters across policies using fuzzy
string matching [8] with the following thresholds for
each CI parameter: sender (70%), attribute (65%), re-
cipient (70%), and transmission principle (55%). While
the fuzzy string matching worked well, some corner
cases required manual validation. We describe some no-
table differences between information flows in the previ-
ous and updated policies on a parameter-by-parameter
basis as follows:
2 https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/update
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CI Parameter Previous Updated
Sender people you share and communi-
cate with
specific friends or accounts, friends and followers, other people using Face-
book and Instagram, people
devices, phones, computers, de-
vices where you install or access
our Services
connected TVs, web-connected devices you use that integrate with our Prod-
ucts
Recipient family of companies that are
part of Facebook
Facebook companies, Facebook company products
people you share and communi-
cate
audience they choose, specific friends or accounts, those you connect and
share with around the world, people in your networks, friends and followers,
people and businesses outside the audience that you shared with, anyone who
can see the other person’s content, anyone on or off our products
partners conducting academic
research, partners conducting
surveys
research partners, research partners who we collaborate with, academics
third-party companies who help
us provide and improve our ser-
vices or who use advertising or
related products
websites that integrate with our products, other services that integrate with
our products, companies that aggregate
N/A systems, devices and operating systems providing native versions of Facebook
and Instagram (i.e. where we have not developed our own first-party apps),
anyone on or off our product, content creator, seller, page admins, regulators,
network
Attribute information about how you use
our services, how you use and in-
teract with our services
information about any of your Instagram followers, the ads you see and how
you use their services, other web-connected devices you use that integrate
with our products, when you last used our products, whether a window is
foregrounded or backgrounded, when you’re using and have last used our
products, identifiers from apps or accounts that you use, actions that you
have taken on our products
content about you the features you use, life events, racial or ethnic origin, activities, where
you live, what games you play, information about your interests actions and
connections, who you are “interested in", your health, events you attend,
interests, preferences, your religious views, general demographic, the places
you like to go and the businesses and people you’re near, whether you are
currently active on Instagram messenger or Facebook, check-ins, websites
you visit, other information about your Facebook friends from you, political
views, trade union membership, philosophical beliefs
information about the reach and
effectiveness of their advertising
reports about the kinds of people seeing their ads, which Facebook ads led
you to make a purchase or take an action with an advertiser, ads you see,
family device ids
Device information information about operations and behaviours performed on the device, other
identifiers unique to Facebook company products associated with the same
device or account, available storage space
N/A information about nearby wi-fi access points beacons and cell towers
Transmission
Principle
N/A to detect when someone needs help, to recognise you in photos videos and
camera experiences, help you stream a video from your phone to your tv,
combat harmful conduct, can help distinguish humans from bots, to aid
relief efforts, whether or not you have a Facebook account or are logged in
to Facebook, reshared or downloaded through APIs, to have lawful rights to
collect, use and share your data before providing any data to us and many
others.
Table 1. List of notable CI parameters that were introduced or refined between the previous and updated Facebook privacy policies.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of unique CI parameters identified in the pre-
vious and updated Facebook privacy policies.
CI Param Version Instances (frequency)
Recipients Previous we [Facebook] (22), Third party ser-
vice, vendors, partners (20)
Updated we [Facebook] (32), Third party ser-
vice, vendors, partners (24)
Senders Previous we [Facebook] (14), you (6)
Updated we [Facebook] (17), you (11)
Attributes Previous information (8), information about
you (2), information we have (2),
non-personally identifiable informa-
tion only (2)
Updated information (15), content (5), infor-
mation about you (4), information
that we have (4), public informa-
tion (4), communications (2), ship-
ping and contact details (2).
Table 2. The most frequent recipients, senders, and attributes
mentioned in the previous and updated Facebook privacy policies.
Sender. The updated policy offers a more detailed
account of the sources of information transfer. It elabo-
rates on categories from the previous privacy policy and
also includes several new senders, such as “WhatsApp”,
“connected TV”, “a business” which were not specified
in the previous policy. Not surprisingly, the most fre-
quent senders in both policies are Facebook and the
consumer (Table 2).
Recipient. Similarly to the sender parameter, the
updated version introduces new recipients, such as “peo-
ple and businesses outside the audience that you shared
with,” “content creators,” “page admin,” “Instagram
business profiles,” and “companies that aggregate.” As
expected, the most common “recipients” in both ver-
sions are “Facebook,” and “third party service, vendors,
partners” (Table 2).
Attribute. When describing the types of informa-
tion being transferred or collected, the updated policy
contains more attributes (179) than the the previous
policy (86). However, we note that some attributes from
the previous policy were omitted in the update. The
updated policy does not mention “user id” (opting for
“username” instead), or “age range” (instead providing
the example “. . . ad was seen by a woman between the
ages of 25 and 34”). Generally, the updated policy de-
scribes new types of information and/or elaborates on
information that was previously generic or abstract (Ta-
ble 1). For example, the updated draft provides signifi-
cantly more details about the type of content that is be-
ing collected about the user, including “racial or ethnic
origins,” “health,” “events attended,” “interests,” “reli-
gious views,” “general demographics,” “political views,”
“trade union membership,” and “philosophical beliefs.”
Furthermore, the updated policy describes attributes
not discussed in the previous policy, such as “connected
TVs,” “information about nearby Wi-Fi access points,”
“beacons,” and “cell towers.”
Transmission Principle. When specifying con-
ditions under which information transfer may be per-
formed, the updated policy includes all conditions and
information flow constraints in the previous policy. In
addition, the updated policy also contains new transmis-
sion principles, such as “whether or not you have a Face-
book account or are logged in to Facebook,” “to recog-
nise you in photos, videos and camera experiences,” “re-
shared or downloaded through APIs,” “to have lawful
rights to collect, use and share your data before provid-
ing any data to us,” and many others (Table 1).
Subject. The subject of most flows in both policies
is the consumer. We therefore do not include the subject
parameter in our analysis.
5.1.2 Incomplete Information Flows
Our analysis of the Facebook privacy policies finds
many prescribed information flows with missing (non-
specified) parameters (Figure 3). Failing to specify pa-
rameters introduces ambiguity, leaving consumers un-
informed about company behavior. In the previous pri-
vacy policy, 45% (19/42) of flows are missing one or
more parameters. In the updated policy, this number
increases to 68% (49/72).
Missing Recipient. Table 3 lists the flows from
both policies with missing recipient parameter. The pre-
vious policy only has one flow without an explicit re-
cipient while the updated policy has two. Not stating
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Fig. 3. Percentage of incomplete information flows in Facebook’s
previous and updated privacy policies with missing CI parameters.
Information Flow Version
When you comment on another person’s post
or like their content on Facebook, that person
decides the audience who can see your comment
or like
Previous
You can choose to provide information in your
Facebook profile fields or life events about your
religious views, political views, who you are “in-
terested in” or your health. This and other infor-
mation (such as racial or ethnic origin, philosoph-
ical beliefs or trade union membership) could be
subject to special protections under the laws of
your country
Updated
For example, people can share a photo of you
in a story or mention, tag you at a location in
a post or share information about you in their
posts or messages
Updated
Table 3. Information flows in the previous and updated Facebook
privacy policies with missing recipient parameters.
information recipients forces users to infer what entities
will have access to their information from other sources,
often leading to incorrect notions of company behav-
ior [21, 32]. Identifying the recipient can sometimes be
difficult, as in the flow “We are able to suggest that your
friend tags you in a picture by comparing your friend’s
pictures to information we’ve put together from your
profile pictures and the other photos in which you’ve
been tagged.”
Missing Sender. The sender parameter is not
specified in 14 (33%) flows in the previous policy nor in
33 (45%) flows in the updated policy. Many of the state-
ments with missing senders describe “use-of-data,” i.e.,
they inform the consumer how the collected information
will be used but not from where it is collected. Missing
senders can easily lead to misinterpretations and false
privacy expectations. For example, the source of the in-
formation in the following statement is unclear: “We
collect information about the people, Pages, accounts,
hashtags and groups you are connected to and how you
interact with them across our Products, such as people
you communicate with the most or groups you are part
of.”
Missing Transmission Principle. We identified
6 information flows in the previous policy where the
transmission principle was missing. For example, the
statement “We share information we have about you
within the family of companies that are part of Facebook”
does not specify under what conditions/constraints the
information is being shared. Likewise, the statement
“We also collect information about how you use our Ser-
vices, such as the types of content you view or engage
with or the frequency and duration of your activities.
Things others do and information they provide” does
not contain any transmission principles. These state-
ments force consumers to guess when and for what rea-
son information is collected.
The updated policy contains even more (15) flows
with missing transmission principles. Without a trans-
mission principle, flows like “We also receive informa-
tion about your online and offline actions and purchases
from third-party data providers who have the rights to
provide us with your information” become ambiguous
because it is not clear when or why this information is
being collected.
5.1.3 CI Parameter Bloating
Our CI annotation analysis also identifies several flows
in both previous and updated policies with multiple
CI parameters of the same type. We refer to this phe-
nomenon as CI parameter bloating. Parameter bloating
adds to the cognitive effort required to isolate single in-
formation flows from privacy policy statements, because
it is often not clear which combinations of parameters
describe information flows that actually take place.
Consider the following flow from the updated policy:
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Advertisers, app developers and pub-
lisherssenders can send usrecipient information
through Facebook Business Tools that they
use, including our social plug-ins (such as
the Like button), Facebook Login, our APIs
and SDKs or the Facebook pixelTP . These
partners provide information about yoursubject
activities off Facebook including informa-
tion about your device, websites you visit,
purchases you make, the ads you see and
how you use their services whether or not
you have a Facebook account or are logged
in to Facebookattributes.
At first glance, the above privacy statement seems trans-
parent and informative. It explicitly specifies the type
of information that is being exchanged, between what
actors and under what conditions. However, this is an
example of CI parameter bloating. The prescribed in-
formation flow is overloaded with CI parameters. Note
the many senders (advertisers, app developers and pub-
lishers) attributes (information about your device, web-
sites you visit, purchases you make, the ads you see and
how you use their services), and transmission principles
(when you use Like, Facebook login, APIs, SDKs and
through Facebook Pixel). How does the consumer rea-
son about this information flow? Do all listed senders
transfer all of these information types to Facebook or
does each particular sender transmit a specific infor-
mation type? Do flows with each sender/information
pair occur under each listed TP or only specific ones?
Even technically-savvy users will have difficulty reason-
ing about the many possible information flows with all
combinations of each parameter type.
We would like to emphasize that specifying multi-
ple instances of the same parameter does not automati-
cally lead to parameter bloating. Specifically, parameter
bloating does not include instances where a single pa-
rameter is enumerated to clarify a given category, as
in the following statement, which elaborates on several
attributes:
Werecipients collect information about how use our
Products, such as types of content you view or en-
gage with, the features you use, the actions you
take, the people or accounts you interact with and
the time, frequency and duration of your activi-
tiesattributes.
Figure 4 shows the number of CI parameters per
flow in both current and updated policies. In the pre-
vious policy, there are 10 information flows that men-
tion more than one recipient, with one information flow
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Fig. 4. Number of CI parameters per flow in Facebook’s previous
(top) and updated (bottom) privacy policies. The previous policy
had one flow with 18 attributes and the updated policy has one
flow with 40 attributes that are omitted for readability.
standing out, listing 10 potential recipients. Three flows
mention more than one sender, and 16 flows mention
multiple attributes, ranging from 2 to 18 attributes
per flow. Multiple transmission principles appear in 16
flows, ranging from 2 to 5 TPs per flow.
The updated policy contains even more bloated
flows. Multiple senders appears in 8 information flows (2
senders in 6 flows, 3 in 1 flow, and 4 in 1 flow). Multiple
attributes occur in 36 flows ranging from 2 attributes in
18 flows to 40 attributes in a single flow. Nineteen of the
flows include more than one recipient (2 recipients in 14
flows, 3 in 4 flows, and 7 in 1 flow). Finally, the number
of flows with multiple transmission principles increased
to 30, ranging from 2 TPs in 14 flows to 8 TPs in a
single flow.
Given that an average consumer today spends little
to no time reading privacy policies, it is unreasonable to
assume that the even the most privacy-concern citizen
will dissect all possible combinations of this many multi-
parameter flows.
5.1.4 Vague and Ambiguous Flows
CI annotation analysis also allow us to identify informa-
tion flows that use vague terminology as defined in [6]
(Table 4).
Figure 5 shows the percentage of flows in Facebook’s
previous and updated policies that use vague terminol-
ogy. In both policies, “modality” vagueness dominates,
occurring in close to 45% of all flows. The updated pol-
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Category Definition Example Terms
Conditionality it is not clear what is the condition as-
sociated with information transfer
“as needed”, “as necessary”, “as appropriate”, “depending”,
“sometimes”, “as applicable”, “otherwise reasonably deter-
mined”, “from time to time”
Generalization action or information types are too ab-
stract or vague
“typically", “normally", “often" , “general", “usually", “gener-
ally", “commonly ", “among other things", “widely", “primarily",
“largely", “mostly"
Modality Hard to estimate the possibility of oc-
currence
“likely", “may", “can", “could" “would", “might", “could", “pos-
sibly"
Numeric Quantifier Vague numeric quantifier “certain", “most", "majority", "many", "some" "few"
Table 4. Summary of four vagueness categories as defined in [6] and associated example terms.
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Fig. 5. Percentage of information flows in Facebook’s previous
and updated privacy policies with various categories of vague
wording (categories defined in Table 4)
.
icy does not represent a reduction in vague terminol-
ogy from the previous version. Rather, the percentage
of flows with vague terms remains the same. This sup-
ports our initial claim the updated data policy does not
contribute to clarity. The widespread occurrence of flows
with vague wording further supports the problem that
privacy policies are too often “obtuse and noncommittal
[and] make it difficult for people to know what informa-
tion a site collects and how it will be used” [31].
5.2 Summary
The updated Facebook privacy policy has twice as many
information flows as the previous policy (Figure 2).
However, more information flows does not necessarily
equal less confusion. Our analysis shows that many of
the newly introduced information flows are either in-
complete, overloaded with CI parameters and/or use
vague terms.
Rather than fix fundamental issues in their privacy
policy in the wake of the Cambrige Analytica scandal,
Facebook seems to have opted to add more terms, en-
tities, and conditions. While this may initially seem to
provide additional information to the consumer, CI an-
notation analysis reveals that there are still many is-
sues preventing users from interpreting clear informa-
tion flows from these new details and from understand-
ing how their data is being collected and shared.
6 Crowdsourcing CI Annotations
The ability to effectively crowdsource CI annotation
would allow researchers to efficiently pursue two pri-
mary goals: 1) collect a large dataset of annotations in
order to train a machine learning model to perform CI
annotation automatically, and 2) perform a large-scale
analysis of information flows across the privacy policies
of many companies. This would provide a broad sense
of information flow disclosure practices across the tech-
nology sector via many of the same analysis methods
used in the Facebook case study.
We have developed a crowdsourcing technique that
poses CI annotation as an Amazon Mechanical Turk
(AMT) Human Intelligence Task (HIT). We crowd-
sourced the annotation of 48 privacy policy excerpts,
including 16 excerpts from the Google privacy policy
circa October 2017 and 16 pairs of excerpts from the
pre-GDPR and post-GDPR privacy policies of 16 well-
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known companies3. This choice of policy excerpts pro-
vides evidence that our crowdsourcing technique is effec-
tive within a single policy as well as for privacy policies
across the technology sector. The excerpt pairs were se-
lected as representative statements from the pre-GDPR
policies of each company and the corresponding state-
ments from the GDPR-compliant version of each policy
updated in May 2018. The excerpts ranged from 21 to
113 words4 and from 1 to 4 sentences for a total of 2621
annotated words over 103 annotated sentences.
We compared the crowdsourced annotations to
ground-truth annotations from a CI expert. The crowd-
sourced annotations had an average word-based preci-
sion of 0.9 across CI information flow parameters, in-
dicating that the crowdworkers understood the rela-
tively complex notion of information flow parameters
and were able to correctly identify them in real privacy
policy text. These results show that crowdsourcing can
be an effectual tool for CI annotation. We will release
the crowdsourced annotations as a public dataset for
further analysis upon publication.
Sections 6.1–6.7 describe the design and evaluation
of our CI annotation crowdsourcing method in more de-
tail.
6.1 Annotation Task Design
We developed the annotation task as a Qualtrics [23]
survey deployed on AMT. The task was designed to op-
timize annotation accuracy while minimizing cost.
Consent and Instructions. The first page of the
annotation task is a consent form. Participants who do
not consent are prevented from proceeding. The annota-
tion task collects no personal information about crowd-
workers and was approved by our university’s Institu-
tional Review Board.
The task next presents annotation instructions (Ap-
pendix Figure 9), including a description of each in-
formation flow parameter that should be annotated
(sender, attribute, recipient, and transmission princi-
ple) and an example annotated flow. The information
flow parameter descriptions match those used by expert
annotaters as described in Section 4.
3 Amazon, Fitbit, Indiegogo, LinkedIn, The New York Times,
Mirosoft, Shapeways, Slack, Spotify, Steam, Stripe, Tinder,
Twitter, Uber, WhatsApp, Yelp
4 Mean: 55 words/excerpt, SD: 23 words/excerpt
Fig. 6. Screening questions to identify AMT workers who are
able to perform high accuracy annotations. The ground truth
annotations are shown with sender in blue, recipient in green,
attribute in red, and transmission principle in purple. Common
English stopwords (except “you,” “your,” “them,” and “we”) are
not counted when comparing crowdworker annotations to the
ground truth.
Screening Questions. Each crowdworker is asked
to annotate (highlight and label) all words and phrases
corresponding to CI information flow parameters in
three privacy policy excerpts (Figure 6). These excerpts
serve as screening questions to identify workers who
are able to perform high-accuracy annotations. Work-
ers whose annotations have at least a 0.7 word-based
F1 score (Section 6.4) compared to ground-truth expert
annotations on the first screening question (for which
the correct answer is given) and either of the next two
screening questions are allowed to proceed with the task.
Workers whose annotations do not meet this accuracy
threshold do not proceed. This helps limit the effect and
cost of workers who do not understand the task or who
attempt to “cheat” by performing minimal annotations
(e.g., highlighting just the first word in each excerpt).
Annotations. Each worker who passes the screen-
ing questions is then asked to annotate 5 of the 48 ex-
cerpts of interest, although these could be replaced with
arbitrary privacy policy excerpts for future research.
The format of these annotation questions is equivalent
to the screening questions (Figure 6). The instructions
are also repeated at the top of the page for workers to
refer to if they wish.
Annotations of all excerpts from multiple workers
are collected, analyzed, and processed into the final
crowdsourced annotation for each privacy policy (Sec-
tion 6.3).
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The task concludes with a field for optional open-
ended comments if participants have anything they wish
to communicate to the researchers.
6.2 Task Deployment
We first tested the annotation task on UserBob [33], a
usability-testing service where users narrate their expe-
rience while performing tasks. We collected seven User-
Bob responses. All UserBob workers completed the task
in less than 15 minutes. We used the UserBob responses
to adjust task instructions to ameliorate worker confu-
sion. Performing such “cognitive interviews” is common
practice in survey design and development [30].
We deployed the annotation task as a HIT on AMT
using TurkPrime [18], an online tool for researchers to
easily manage AMT tasks. We limited the HIT to AMT
workers in the United States with an HIT approval rat-
ing of 90–100% and at least 100 HITs approved. 141
total workers accepted the HIT. Of these workers, 99
passed the screener questions. All 48 excerpts were an-
notated by between 7 and 12 workers (mean 10.2).
AMT workers who did not pass the screening ques-
tions were automatically reimbursed $0.25. AMT work-
ers who passed the screening test and completed the
entire annotation task were reimbursed $1.50. Collect-
ing all responses took approximately 4 hours.
6.3 Majority Vote Annotations
We are ultimately interested in acquiring the single
highest-accuracy annotation for each privacy policy in-
dependent of individual workers. We therefore combine
multiple annotations of each privacy policy excerpt into
a “majority vote” annotation, which assigns each word
in an excerpt to the CI parameter annotated by at least
50% of the participants presented with that excerpt. If
fewer than 50% of workers labeled a word with the same
parameter, then the word is given no label in the ma-
jority vote annotation.
6.4 Evaluation Metrics
We had one of the authors perform expert ground truth
annotations of all excerpts prior to seeing the crowd-
sourced results. We use the following evaluation metrics
to compare the crowdsourced majority vote annotations
to the expert annotations.
Parameter-based scoring. We manually counted
all instances of each CI parameter labeled in both
the crowdsourced majority vote and expert annotations
(true positives), in the expert annotation only (false
negatives), and in the crowdsourced annotation only
(false positives). We further categorized the false pos-
itives and false negatives to better understand crowd-
worker mistakes and how to improve the annotation task
in future studies (Section 6.6).
Word-based scoring. We also applied a auto-
mated word-based scoring method that did not re-
quire manually comparing variable-length parameters
and could be used to easily evaluate future large-scale
CI annotation efforts.
We first removed common English stopwords from
all annotations to prevent variations in article or prepo-
sition highlighting from affecting annotation compar-
isons. We used the stopword list in Python NLTK li-
brary [7] less “you,” “your,” “them,” and “we,” as these
pronouns could have been senders or recipients in the
privacy policy excerpts.
True positives are then words labeled by both the
participant and the expert. False positives are words la-
beled by the participant only. False negatives are words
labeled by the expert only. This allows us to calculate
word-based precision, recall, and F1 scores for each CI
parameter and excerpt. Some CI parameters do not oc-
cur in every excerpt. If the expert did not label a partic-
ular parameter in an excerpt, participants’ recalls were
defined as 1 for the corresponding annotation. If a par-
ticipant did not label a particular element in an excerpt,
the participant’s precision was defined as 1 for the cor-
responding annotation. These are standard definitions
of precision and recall for edge cases.
6.5 Annotation Accuracy
Figure 7 shows the counts of correctly and incor-
rectly annotated CI parameters across all excerpts from
parameter-based scoring. The incorrect annotations are
divided into categories to better understand the source
of crowdworker errors. The crowdsourced majority vote
annotations correctly labeled 43% of the senders, 89%
of the attributes, 68% of the recipients, and 60% of the
transmission principles across all excerpts. False neg-
atives were by far the most common error, with the
crowdsourced annotations missing 30% of the senders,
9% of the attributes, 21% of the recipients, and 34% of
the transmission principles across all excerpts. Finally,
false positive errors comprised 26% of the senders, 2%
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Fig. 7. Parameter-based evaluation of crowdsourced majority vote
annotations compared to expert ground truth. Correct (true pos-
itive) annotations are parameters labeled to match the expert
annotation. Skipped (false negative) annotations are parameters
only labeled by the expert. All other incorrect annotations (false
positives) are described in Section 6.6. Note that most errors are
skipped parameters (false negatives), indicating that the crowd-
workers understood the task, but that further work is needed to
improve recall.
of the attributes, 11% of the recipients, and 6% of the
transmission principles across all excerpts.5
Figure 8 shows the distributions of word-based pre-
cision and recall scores for the majority vote annota-
tions across all excerpts and for each CI parameter.
The average precision across all excerpts is 0.95 for at-
tributes, 0.80 for senders, 0.89 for recipients, and 0.94
for a transmission principles. The corresponding aver-
age recall across all excerpts is 0.87 for attributes, 0.82
for senders, 0.83 for recipients, and 0.59 for transmission
principles.
Overall, the high precision of the majority vote
crowdworker annotations (by both parameter-based and
word-based scoring methods) indicates that the major-
ity of crowdworkers understood the CI annotation task,
and were able to correctly identify and highlight CI pa-
rameters in short privacy policy excerpts. However, the
many false negatives indicates that the framing of the
task could potentially be improved to help crowdwork-
ers avoid missing or intentionally skipping some param-
eters.
5 Percentages were rounded to the nearest whole value and may
not add to 100%
Fig. 8. Word-based precision and recall scores of majority vote
crowdsourced annotations compared to expert ground truth for
each CI element.
6.6 Evaluating Crowdworker Errors
Analyzing the crowdsourced annotations raises the
question “What causes particular excerpts or CI param-
eters to be more difficult for crowdworkers to annotate
than others?”
One intuitive explanation is that excerpts that are
longer, more difficult to read, or contain more CI param-
eters are more difficult for crowdworkers to annotate.
To test this hypothesis, we calculated Spearman corre-
lations of the majority vote annotation word-based F1
scores versus text length, Flesch-Kincaid Reading Ease
[16], FOG Index [16], and number of CI parameters (Ap-
pendix Table 5). However, all of the resulting correlation
coefficients had absolute values less than 0.5, indicating
no strong correlations with F1 score. This suggests that
crowdworker difficulties with certain excerpts or param-
eters are due to more nuanced factors than length or
readability.
We further investigate these factors by manually
comparing the crowdsourced majority vote annotations
to the expert annotations. We noticed that crowdwork-
ers had more difficulty annotating senders and recip-
ients than attributes and transmission principles. At-
tributes and transmission principles are generally nouns
or verbs, occur in lists, and require less semantic parsing
to identify. In contrast, senders and attributes are often
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pronouns that occur singly and require more complex
sentence parsing to distinguish between them.
More detailed analysis indicated that the 160
parameter-based annotation errors fall into four main
categories. Each category has corresponding implica-
tions for crowdsourcing CI annotations.
6.6.1 Expert Errors
We identified 11 cases where the majority vote crowd-
sourced annotation was correct while the “ground-
truth” expert annotation was incorrect. Most of these
cases were due to the expert missing a one-word sender
or recipient, e.g. “we.” We did not adjust recall or preci-
sion scores to reflect the incorrect expert annotations, as
these judgments were made after, and could have been
influenced by, viewing the crowdsourced annotations.
However, the presence of these incorrect expert annota-
tions demonstrates the non-triviality of the annotation
task.
6.6.2 Skipped Parameters
The most common error occurred when the crowdwork-
ers simply neglected to annotate some or all instances of
a given parameter. These errors were the primary con-
tributor to lowering recall scores without affecting preci-
sion. We identified 117 skipped parameter errors. There
are three possible reasons why crowdworkers might have
neglected to annotate all instances of each parameter:
1) the workers may have considered an excerpt and hon-
estly thought that it didn’t contain the parameter, 2)
the workers may have intentionally skipped entire pa-
rameters, or 3) the workers may have found one or two
instances of each parameter and then moved on to the
next excerpt without double-checking to ensure that
none were missed. This could be due to cognitive fa-
tigue or the fact that crowdworkers are incentivized to
finish the annotations as quickly as possible to optimize
their hourly compensation rate.
As an example of reason 1, consider the sentence
“We collect information when you sync non-content like
your email address book, mobile device contacts, or cal-
endar with your account.” Both the expert and the
crowdworkers correctly labeled “email address book,”
“mobile device contacts,” and “calendar” as attributes.
However, the expert also labeled “information” as an
attribute, while the majority vote annotation did not.
This was marked as a false negative “skipped parame-
ter” error, but “information” does not provide any spe-
cific details about the attribute, so it is understandable
that the crowdworkers omitted this label. This specific
skipped parameter error (“information” not labeled as
attribute) occurred in 6 of the annotated excerpts.
Skipped errors could potentially reduced in future
crowdsourcing tasks by using previous crowdworker an-
notations to provide “hints” for successive workers. For
example, the number of parameters annotated by pre-
vious workers could be shown (likely as a range) to in-
dicate approximately how many parameters the current
worker should find. This would help address reason 3
for skipped errors above, providing a nudge for workers
finding fewer parameters to continue searching for addi-
tional annotations. However, such hints would have to
be carefully applied to prevent individual crowdworker
errors from negatively influencing the collective annota-
tion effort.
6.6.3 Ambiguous Parameters
Ambiguous parameter errors occurred when a CI pa-
rameter was mislabeled compared to the expert anno-
tation, but the correct labeling is ultimately open to in-
terpretation. Consider the sentence “If you want to take
full advantage of the sharing features we offer, we might
also ask you to create a publicly visible Google Profile,
which may include your name and photo.” In this sen-
tence, “publicly” could be interpreted as a recipient, i.e.
the public would receive the data in the Google Pro-
file. However, “publicly” could also be interpreted as a
transmission principle i.e. the flow is from “you” to your
“Google Profile” and the condition on the flow is that
it is public. The expert labeled “publicly” as a recipi-
ent, while the crowdsourced majority did not. We only
identified 3 such ambiguous parameter errors, indicat-
ing that CI information flow descriptions map naturally
to privacy policy texts.
6.6.4 Overlapping Parameters
Overlapping parameter errors occurred when a CI pa-
rameter was mislabeled compared to the expert anno-
tation, but the text in question is part of two or more
CI parameters simultaneously. We identified 16 overlap-
ping parameter errors. Consider the excerpt “When you
use our services or view content provided by Google, we
automatically collect and store certain information in
server logs.” The first clause (before the comma) could
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be interpreted as a single transmission principle, but the
“you” could also be a sender. Variations on this issue
were the primary cause of false positive errors for the
“sender” parameter, i.e. the expert annotated an entire
clause as a transmission principle but the majority vote
annotation instead labeled a single word in the clause
as a sender.
The presence of overlapping parameter errors is due
to a tradeoff in our implementation of the CI annota-
tion task. We chose to allow only one CI parameter an-
notation per word in each excerpt to simplify the task
for workers. This tradeoff could be avoided in future
work by asking each crowdworker to annotate only a sin-
gle CI parameter type, simplifying the task from multi-
class classification to binary classification. However, this
would require more crowdworkers per policy and could
lead to higher rates of false positives if crowdworkers
aren’t forced to discriminate between different parame-
ters.
6.6.5 True Errors
True errors occurred when the crowdworkers unambigu-
ously misannotated a CI parameter. Fortunately, true
errors accounted for only 13 out of 160 total errors in
the majority vote annotation. This implies that when a
label makes it into the majority vote annotation (with
sufficient workers contributing to the vote), it is very
likely to be correct. The low frequency of true errors
indicates that, with improvements to reduce the num-
ber of skipped parameter errors, crowdsourcing can be
a high-accuracy method of obtaining CI annotations of
privacy policies.
6.7 Summary
Our proof-of-concept experiment shows that crowd-
workers with no prior exposure to CI are able to quickly
understand and perform CI annotations of legalistic
privacy policies. Labels which make it into a majority
vote annotation compiled from several individual crowd-
workers are very likely correct. This supports the no-
tion that CI-style information flows are a natural way
for people to think about privacy and thereby a use-
ful framework for analyzing privacy policies and privacy
policy updates.
7 Discussion
We present a CI annotation methodology to help re-
searchers and regulators assess and evaluate privacy
policies. This work is a stepping stone in a larger ef-
fort to improve readability and increase transparency
in disclosure of information handling practices. While
philosophical in origin, the theory of CI offers a practi-
cal framework to reason about privacy implications in a
given context and therefore serves as a powerful tool for
reasoning about privacy preserving efforts in technical
fields.
The notion of an appropriate information flow in
the CI framework lends itself well to user data privacy
policies; privacy statements are essentially prescribed by
the policy information flows. Annotating privacy poli-
cies with CI parameter labels offers a way to apply a
full-fledged formal theory of privacy to their analysis.
Relevant stakeholders—consumers, legal scholars, and
regulators—can perform qualitative, quantitative and
normative analysis to find incomplete, vague and am-
biguous privacy statements. This also enables leverag-
ing other applications of the CI framework. For exam-
ple, it is possible to compare which flows prescribed by
the policy align or do not align with consumers privacy
expectations [5].
As privacy policies evolve, CI annotations assist
comparative analyses of new updates to identify which
information flows were amended, added or removed.
These analyses will ideally help companies write more
coherent and complete privacy policies by identifying
privacy statements containing missing, vague and/or
bloated CI parameters.
Furthermore, we can use our CI annotation crowd-
sourcing methodology to produce a large corpus of pri-
vacy policies annotations and discover trends and pat-
terns in the types of flows that are being prescribed by
policies within and across industries. This corpus could
also be used as a training set to build tools for auto-
matically identifying CI flows and parameters in privacy
policies.
8 Limitations and Future Work
We have identified the following opportunities for fur-
ther research to improve and streamline the CI annota-
tion process:
First, privacy policies are not written to inten-
tionally fit the CI framework. As discussed in Sec-
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tions 5 and 6, privacy policy terms can be ambiguous,
vague, compound and even missing. This complicates
the task of annotating privacy policy text with CI pa-
rameter labels. Nevertheless, our crowdsourcing anno-
tations showed promising results on a diverse privacy
statements from privacy policies of 17 companies. In
future work, we intend to continue validating the CI
annotation approach on larger policy samples.
Second, our annotation methodology deals only
with statements describing information transfers. These
statements comprise the majority of privacy policy text
and lend themselves to the CI framework. However,
other statements, such as those describing how long
information is stored, when and how information is
purged, and what features allow users to fine tune pri-
vacy settings, fall outside the reasoning of the CI frame-
work. Annotating these statements will require addi-
tional methodologies to complement our approach. A
blended technique, such as combining CI annotation for
information transfer statements with more general tags
like those used by the Usable Privacy Project [26], could
provide the rigor of our CI technique with the flexibility
to account for the diversity of information included in
privacy policies.
9 Conclusion
This paper presents a methodology for analyzing pri-
vacy policies using annotations based on the theory of
contextual integrity [22]. We perform a case study anno-
tation of pre- and post-GDPR Facebook privacy policies
and demonstrate that CI offers a rigorous way to exam-
ine privacy statements. We find that Facebook’s post-
GDPR privacy policy describes more total information
flows with more parameters than the pre-GDPR ver-
sion, but the updates do not improve the percentage of
flows that contain vague language, omit parameters, or
include many parameters of the same type. These issues
impede interpretability, preventing users from clearly
understanding how their information is being collected
and shared.
To further scale our approach, we present a method
for crowdsourcing CI annotation of privacy policies. We
test this method on 48 excerpts from 17 policies with
141 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. Resulting high-
precision crowdsourced annotations indicate that CI an-
notation is an intuitive method for interpreting privacy
policies and that crowdsourcing could be used to obtain
a large corpus of annotated privacy policies for future
analysis.
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Appendix
Fig. 9. CI annotation task instructions.
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Statistic CI Parameter Corr. coeff. p-value
Total # words Attribute -0.03 0.82
Sender 0.03 0.86
Recipient -0.11 0.46
TP -0.15 0.30
# words labeled Attribute 0.07 0.62
as CI parameters Sender 0.10 0.48
by expert Recipient 0.01 0.96
TP -0.02 0.89
Flesch-Kincaid Attribute 0.14 0.35
Reading Ease Sender 0.20 0.18
Recipient 0.10 0.49
TP -0.05 0.76
FOG Index Attribute 0.15 0.32
Sender 0.19 0.19
Recipient 0.10 0.50
TP -0.06 0.67
Table 5. Spearman correlations of majority vote annotation word-based F1 scores for each CI parameter versus various statistics of
corresponding privacy policy excerpts.
